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This	  paper	  discusses	  the	  ecological	  case	  for	  epistemic	  innocence:	  does	  biased	  cognition	  have	  
evolutionary	   benefits,	   and	   if	   so,	   does	   that	   exculpate	   human	   reasoners	   from	   irrationality?	  
Proponents	  of	   ‘ecological	   rationality’	   have	   challenged	   the	  bleak	   view	  of	   human	   reasoning	  
emerging	   from	   research	   on	   biases	   and	   fallacies.	   If	   we	   approach	   the	   human	   mind	   as	   an	  
adaptive	   toolbox,	   tailored	   to	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   environment,	   many	   alleged	   biases	   and	  
fallacies	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  artefacts	  of	  narrow	  norms	  and	  artificial	  set-­‐ups.	  However,	  we	  argue	  
that	   putative	   demonstrations	   of	   ecological	   rationality	   involve	   subtle	   locus	   shifts	   in	  
attributions	   of	   rationality,	   conflating	   the	   adaptive	   rationale	   of	   heuristics	   with	   our	   own	  
epistemic	   credentials.	   By	   contrast,	   other	   cases	   also	   involve	   an	   ecological	   reframing	   of	  
human	  reason,	  but	  do	  not	  involve	  such	  problematic	  locus	  shifts.	  We	  discuss	  the	  difference	  




Like	  any	  other	  biological	  organ,	   the	  human	  brain	   is	  a	  product	  of	  evolution	  by	  
natural	   selection:	   The	   brain	   secretes	   thought	   as	   the	   liver	   secretes	   bile,	   wrote	   the	   18th	  
century	  French	  physiologist	  Pierre	  Cabanis	  in	  his	  Des	  Rapports	  du	  Physique	  et	  du	  Morale	  de	  
l’Homme.	   But	   does	   the	   brain’s	   biological	   provenance	   suggest	   it	   must	   be	   successful	   at	  
producing	  true	  beliefs	  and	  making	  rational	  judgments?	  Several	  generations	  of	  psychologists	  
have	  suggested	  otherwise,	  documenting	   the	  myriad	   flaws	  and	   foibles	  of	  human	  reasoning	  
(Gilovich,	  Griffin,	  &	  Kahneman,	  2002;	  Kahneman,	  2011;	  Kahneman,	  Slovic,	  &	  Tversky,	  1982).	  
Especially	  in	  popular	  summaries	  of	  this	  research,	  humans	  come	  off	  rather	  badly	  -­‐	  prone	  to	  
all	   sorts	   of	   biases	   and	   fallacies,	   woefully	   inadequate	   at	   dealing	   with	   probability	   and	  
uncertainty,	   and	   inclined	   to	   persist	   in	  making	   errors	   of	   social	   judgment,	   even	   after	   these	  
have	  been	  clearly	  spelled	  out	  (Ariely,	  2009;	  Piattelli-­‐Palmarini,	  1996;	  Shermer,	  2011;	  Singer	  
&	  Benassi,	  1981;	  Sutherland,	  2007).	  The	  psychologist	   John	  Kihlstrom	  (2004)	  has	  called	  this	  
the	  ‘People	  are	  Stupid’	  school	  of	  psychology	  (PASSP).	  
Recently,	  however,	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  research,	  inspired	  by	  evolutionary	  ideas,	  has	  
posed	  a	  challenge	  to	  this	  bleak	  picture	  of	  human	  reason.	  This	  school	  of	  thought	  heralds	  an	  
ecological	  conception	  of	  rationality,	  aligning	  itself	  with	  research	  in	  evolutionary	  psychology.	  
If	   we	   approach	   the	   human	   mind	   as	   a	   collection	   of	   cognitive	   heuristics,	   tailored	   to	   the	  
structure	  of	  the	  ecological	  environment,	  many	  alleged	  biases	  and	  fallacies	  arguably	  emerge	  
as	  artefacts	  of	  narrow	  norms	  and	  artificial	  set-­‐ups.	  	  
After	   introducing	   this	   ‘ecological	   rationality’	   research	   program,	  we	   identify	   a	  
‘locus	  shift’	  in	  some	  attributions	  of	  rationality.	  In	  these	  cases,	  individual	  reasoners	  are	  being	  
praised	  as	  rational	  simply	  because	  the	  heuristics	  employed	  in	  their	  reasoning	  show	  adaptive	  
design	   (i.e.	   are	   “rational”	   from	  an	  evolutionary	  perspective).	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  adaptive	  
rationale	  of	  cognition	   (evolutionary	   locus)	   is	   conflated	  with	  our	  own	  epistemic	  credentials	  
(personal	   locus).	  We	  then	  evaluate	  whether	  the	  normative	  categories	  of	   (ir)rationality	  can	  
still	   be	   applied	   at	   the	   evolutionary	   level	   of	   analysis,	   and	   conclude	   that	   this	   facet	   of	   the	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‘ecological	  defence’	   is	  confusing:	   (a)	  human	  reasoners	  do	  not	  deserve	   the	  “credit”	   for	   the	  
adaptive	  designs	  they	  have	  been	  equipped	  with,	  and	  (b)	  evolution	  cannot	  exculpate	  human	  
irrationality.	   Finally,	   we	   discuss	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   program	   of	   ecological	   rationality	   has	  
succeeded	  in	  rehabilitating	  human	  reason,	  showing	  that	  earlier	  charges	  of	  irrationality	  had	  
been	  premature.	  These	  cases	  also	   involve	  a	   form	  of	  ecological	   reframing,	  but	   they	  do	  not	  
involve	  adaptive	  locus	  shifts.	  
The	   aim	   of	   this	   paper	   is	   to	   provide	   some	   much	   needed	   clarification	   to	   the	  
debate	  about	  rationality.	  In	  particular,	  by	  clarifying	  which	  'defences'	  of	  putative	  irrationality	  
are	   legitimate	  and	  which	   illegitimate,	  we	  hope	   to	  provide	  a	   robust	   conceptual	   framework	  
within	  which	  to	  situate	  and	  evaluate	  future	  empirical	  evidence.	  The	  debate	  about	  rationality	  
is	   not	   merely	   of	   academic	   interest:	   irrationality	   is	   a	   topic	   of	   critical	   personal	   and	   social	  
import.	   Biased	   beliefs	   about	   the	   self	   and	   the	   future	   may	   promote	   individually	   harmful	  
behaviours	   like	   smoking,	  unsafe	   sex	  and	  overspending,	   as	  well	   as	  potentially	  precipitating	  
global	  catastrophes	  such	  as	  sectarian	  violence,	  world	  wars,	  exploding	  financial	  bubbles	  and	  
environmental	  disasters	  (Johnson	  &	  Fowler,	  2011;	  Sharot,	  2011).	  Given	  these	  wide-­‐ranging	  
outcomes,	   getting	   clear	   about	   the	   nature	   and	   extent	   of	   human	   irrationality	   is	   a	   critical	  
philosophical	  and	  psychological	  project.	  	  
	  
	  
2.	  Ecological	  Rationality	  
	  
2.1	  	  Recasting	  Rationality	  in	  the	  Environment	  
In	   the	  heuristics	  and	  biases	  program	   instigated	  by	  Daniel	  Kahneman	  and	  Amos	  Tversky	   in	  
the	  80s	   (Kahneman,	  2011;	  Kahneman	  et	  al.,	  1982),	  heuristics	  are	  viewed	  as	  mental	   short-­‐
cuts	   leading	   to	   imperfect	   and	   often	   outright	   irrational	   inferences.	   Though	   Kahneman	   and	  
Tversky	   pointed	   out	   that	   even	   fallible	   heuristics	   often	   lead	   to	   successful	   inferences,	   over	  
time	   this	   sense	  of	  balance	  was	   lost,	  and	  a	  negative	   slant	  began	   to	  dominate	   the	   research	  
program	  they	  founded	  (Krueger	  &	  Funder,	  2004).1	  The	  program	  of	  ecological	  rationality,	  by	  
contrast	   (Fawcett	   et	   al.,	   2014;	   Gigerenzer,	   Hertwig,	   &	   Pachur,	   2011;	   Gigerenzer	   &	   Todd,	  
1999;	  Hertwig	  &	  Hoffrage,	  2013;	  Todd	  &	  Gigerenzer,	  2012),	  aims	  to	  effect	  a	  gestalt	  switch,	  
urging	  us	  to	  rethink	  the	  norms	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  rational.	  	  
The	   canons	  of	   ‘classical’	   rationality,	   to	  which	  Kahneman	  &	  Tversky’s	   subjects	  
were	   held	   accountable,	   consist	   of	   a	   general,	   formal,	   content-­‐free	   framework	   for	   valid	  
reasoning	   (e.g.	  modus	  ponens).	  Advocates	  of	   ‘ecological	   rationality’,	  by	  contrast,	  uphold	  a	  
radically	   different	   view	   of	   heuristics.	   Heuristics,	   they	   argue,	   provide	   us	  with	   an	   ‘adaptive	  
toolbox’	   (Gigerenzer,	   2008;	   Gigerenzer	   &	   Todd,	   1999),	   each	   suited	   to	   a	   particular	   set	   of	  
challenges	   endemic	   to	   a	   particular	   environment.	   In	   contrast	   with	   unbounded	   models	   of	  
classical	   rationality,	   which	   typically	   assume	   unlimited	   resources	   both	   with	   regard	   to	  
information	   gathering	   and	   computational	   processing,	   ecological	   rationality	   is	   ‘fast	   and	  
frugal’.	  According	  to	  Gigerenzer	  and	  Todd	  (1999),	  a	  heuristic	   is	  ecologically	  rational	  ‘to	  the	  
degree	   that	   it	   is	   adapted	   to	   the	   structure	   of	   an	   environment’.	   Heuristics	   are	   quick	   and	  
computationally	  cheap,	  requiring	  few	  and	  simple	  computational	  steps,	  and	  operating	  on	  a	  
limited	  input	  domain.	  For	  example,	  when	  confronted	  with	  two	  objects,	  only	  one	  of	  which	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  his	  latest	  work,	  Kahneman	  is	  at	  pains	  to	  disavow	  this	  pessimistic	  turn:	  “I	  often	  cringe	  when	  my	  work	  with	  
Amos	  is	  credited	  with	  demonstrating	  that	  human	  choices	  are	  irrational,	  when	  in	  fact	  our	  research	  only	  showed	  
that	  humans	  are	  not	  well	  described	  by	  the	  rational-­‐agent	  model”	  (Kahneman,	  2011).	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recognized,	   people	   infer	   that	   the	   familiar	   one	   will	   be	  more	   important	   or	   have	   a	   greater	  
value.	  Although	  this	  so-­‐called	  ‘recognition	  heuristic’	  –	  on	  which	  more	  later	  –	  leads	  us	  astray	  
in	   artificial	   set-­‐ups,	   it	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   surprisingly	   accurate	   guide	   to	   real	  world	   problems	  
(Goldstein	  &	  Gigerenzer,	  2002).	  
Proponents	  of	  ecological	  rationality	  claim	  that	  many	  apparent	  demonstrations	  
of	  irrationality	  in	  the	  heuristics	  and	  biases	  program	  are	  artefacts	  of	  inappropriate	  standards	  
and	  narrow	  norms,	  such	  as	  coherence	  criteria	  and	  the	  axioms	  of	  probability	  theory.	  Indeed,	  
many	  experiments	  are	  expressly	  designed	  to	  mislead	  or	  distract	  participants,	  placing	  them	  
in	  situations	  where	  their	  usually	  successful	  strategies	  and	  heuristics	  lead	  them	  astray.	  If	  one	  
canvasses	  the	  same	  phenomena	  in	  a	  broader	  framework,	  however,	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  
structure	  of	  real	  environments,	  computational	  limitations	  and	  various	  trade-­‐offs,	  the	  human	  
mind	  emerges	  as	  more	  rational	  than	  many	  psychologists	  suppose.	  	  
	  
2.2	  Two	  Strands	  
We	   detect	   two	  major	   strands	   in	   the	   re-­‐appreciation	   of	   (apparent)	   human	   irrationality	   as	  
ecologically	   rational.	  On	   the	   one	  hand,	   as	   the	   ecological	   rationalist	   points	   out,	   traditional	  
cognitive	  psychologists	  have	  too	  often	  delighted	   in	  tripping	  up	  their	  subjects	  with	  artificial	  
set-­‐ups	  that	  truncate	  the	  complexity	  of	  real	  life	  and	  human	  intelligence	  (first	  strand).	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  ecological	  rationalists	  have	  argued	  that	  heuristics	  are	  not	  designed	  to	  perform	  
well	  in	  artificial	  (non-­‐ecologically	  valid)	  environments.	  If	  putatively	  ‘irrational’	  subjects	  were	  
tested	   in	   an	   ecologically	   relevant	   context,	   the	   kind	   to	   which	   their	   evolved	   heuristics	   are	  
attuned,	  they	  would	  behave	  rationally	  (second	  strand).	  	  
In	  both	  strands,	  ecological	  rationality	  focuses	  our	  attention	  on	  the	  match	  between	  our	  
reasoning	  and	  the	  real	  world.	  The	  sensible	  argument	  behind	  this	  is	  that	  we	  should	  evaluate	  
heuristics	   in	  their	   ‘proper’	  context.	  You	  should	  not	  use	  a	  screwdriver	  as	  a	  crowbar	  and	  be	  
surprised	   that	   it	   breaks.2	   Whereas	   the	   first	   strand	   focuses	   on	   artificial	   set-­‐ups	   and	  
uncharitable	  experimenters,	  the	  second	  strand	  invokes	  evolutionary	  rationales.	  In	  the	  latter	  
case,	  advocates	  of	  ecological	  rationality	  point	  out	  that	  heuristics	  are	  crafted	  by	  evolution	  to	  
deal	  with	  particular	  adaptive	  problems	  in	  an	  ancestral	  environment.	  Therefore,	  they	  have	  a	  
“proper	   domain”	   of	   application	   (Sperber,	   1996)	   -­‐	   what	   Millikan	   (1984)	   termed	   “Normal	  
conditions”	  –	  outside	  of	  which	  we	  should	  not	  expect	  them	  to	  perform	  well.	  Blaming	  them	  
for	   “malfunction”	   in	   unnatural	   contexts,	   or	   without	   proper	   appreciation	   of	   their	   design	  
features,	   is	   like	  blaming	   the	  screwdriver.	  Nevertheless,	  as	  we	  will	  argue,	  while	   the	   former	  
approach	  is	  (often)	  warranted,	  the	  latter	  involves	  problematic	  locus	  shifts.	  
	  
2.3	  Evolutionary	  Psychology	  
This	  latter	  evolutionary	  strand	  runs	  through	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  ecological	  rationality,	  
(Gigerenzer	  &	   Selten,	   2002).	   And	   indeed,	   the	   program	   connects	  with	  work	   in	   the	   field	   of	  
evolutionary	  psychology	  on	   the	  adaptive	  value	  of	   cognitive	  bias	   (Aktipis	  &	  Kurzban,	  2004;	  
Cosmides	   &	   Tooby,	   1994;	   Haselton	   &	   Nettle,	   2006;	   Haselton,	   Nettle,	   &	   Andrews,	   2005;	  
Mercier	   &	   Sperber,	   2011;	   Nesse,	   2001),	   the	   main	   thrust	   of	   which	   is	   also	   to	   show	   the	  
ecological	  validity	  of	  human	  reason.	  As	  Haselton	  &	  Nettle	  write:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  There	  is	  a	  range	  of	  possibilities	  as	  to	  the	  selection	  of	  heuristics.	  They	  can	  be	  consciously	  crafted	  and	  selected	  
to	   tackle	   certain	  problems	   (through	   individual	   learning)	  or,	   they	  can	  be	  crafted	  by	  evolution	   though	  applied	  
consciously,	  or	   learned	  (reinforced)	  through	  habit	  and	  applied	  unconsciously,	  etc.	   (see	  Marewski	  &	  Schooler,	  
2011;	  Rieskamp	  &	  Otto,	  2006).	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Some	  cognitive	  illusions	  disappear	  or	  greatly	  attenuate	  when	  the	  task	  is	  presented	  in	  an	  ecologically	  
valid	   format	   (Cosmides	   &	   Tooby,	   1996;	   Gigerenzer	   &	   Hoffrage,	   1995).	   Ecological	   validity,	   a	   long-­‐
standing	   but	   undertheorized	   term	   in	   psychology,	   may	   in	   effect	   be	   equated	   to	   the	   task	   format	  
approximating	  some	  task	  that	  humans	  have	  performed	  recurrently	  over	  evolutionary	  time.	  (Haselton	  
&	  Nettle,	  2006).	  
Apparent	   biases	   and	   illusions	   are	   recast	   in	   an	   evolutionary	   light,	   as	   serving	  
some	   adaptive	   rationale.	   From	   an	   adaptationist	   point	   of	   view,	   human	   reason	   is	   not	   the	  
botched	   and	   bias-­‐riddled	   device	   many	   psychologists	   take	   it	   to	   be,	   but	   emerges	   as	   an	  
extremely	   effective,	   highly	   specialized	   set	   of	   adaptive	   tools	   for	   dealing	   with	   recurring	  
problems	  in	  the	  Environment	  of	  Evolutionary	  Adaptedness	  (EEA).	  	  
In	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   research	   program	   of	   ecological	   rationality,	   Gerd	  
Gigerenzer	   wrote	   that	   ‘what	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   fallacy	   can	   often	   also	   be	   seen	   as	   adaptive	  
behaviour,	   if	   one	   is	   willing	   to	   rethink	   the	   norms’	   (Gigerenzer,	   2008).	   In	   a	   similar	   vein,	  
Haselton	  &	  Nettle	  (2006,	  p.	  59)	  have	  written	  ‘bias	  in	  cognition	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  shortcoming	  in	  
rational	   behaviour,	   but	   an	   adaptation	   of	   behaviour	   to	   a	   complex,	   uncertain	   world’.	  
Elsewhere,	  Haselton	  and	   colleagues	  wrote	   ‘an	  adaptationist	  perspective	   suggests	   that	   the	  
mind	  is	  remarkably	  well	  designed	  for	  important	  problems	  of	  survival	  and	  reproduction,	  and	  
not	  fundamentally	  irrational.’	  These	  assessments	  seem	  to	  provide	  solace	  for	  the	  pessimistic	  
view	  of	  human	  reason	  voiced	  by	  many	  psychologists.	  But	  can	  evolution	  really	  get	  us	  off	  the	  
hook?	  
	  
3.	  Assessment	  of	  the	  Locus	  Shift	  in	  Ecological	  Rationality	  
	  
3.1	  Minimal	  Conditions	  for	  Rationality	  
In	   order	   to	   assess	   what	   exactly	   ecological/adaptive	   rationality	   amounts	   to,	   we	   need	   a	  
serviceable	  conception	  of	  rationality.	  While	  attempting	  to	  formulate	  a	  full	  blown	  definition	  
seems	  doomed	  to	  fail,	  given	  the	  loose	  and	  varied	  use	  of	  the	  term,	  some	  constraints	  on	  the	  
meaning	  of	  ‘rationality’	  will	  guide	  us	  through	  this	  treacherous	  terrain.	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  will	  
be	  mainly	  concerned	  with	  epistemic	  rationality	  (belief	  formation	  that	  is	  accurate	  and	  truth-­‐
tracking)	   and	   not	   so	   much	   with	   instrumental	   rationality	   (actions	   that	   maximize	   the	  
probability	   of	   success,	   according	   to	   some	   standard).	   According	   to	   De	   Sousa	   (2009),	  
rationality	  presupposes	   intentionality.	  An	   inanimate	  object	  or	  mere	  mechanism	  cannot	  be	  
rational.	   It	  would	  be	  absurd	  to	  claim	  that	  a	  rock	  falling	  to	  the	  ground	  is	  rationally	  obeying	  
the	  laws	  of	  gravity,	  much	  as	  it	  would	  be	  strange	  to	  call	  a	  calculator	  rational	  because	  it	  yields	  
correct	  answers.	  Likewise,	   irrationality	  is	  a	  condition	  that	  can	  only	  be	  meaningfully	  applied	  
to	   intentional	   creatures	   –	   entities	   capable	   of	   full-­‐blown	   rationality	   (de	   Sousa,	   2007).	  
Irrationality	   is	   a	   term	  of	  epistemic	  disapprobation,	  used	  when	   someone	   fails	   to	   live	  up	   to	  
some	   expected	   normative	   standard.	   As	  ought	   implies	   can,	   it	  makes	   no	   sense	   to	   blame	   a	  
mindless	  process:	  	  
It	  makes	  sense	  to	  criticize	  a	  person,	  but	  not	  a	  cell,	  for	  having	  made	  a	  mistake	  in	  computation,	  or	  with	  
having	   failed	   to	   foresee	  what	   should	  have	  been	   foreseen,	  or	  with	  having	  acted	  on	   reasons	   that	   fell	  
short	  of	  the	  best	  set	  of	  reasons.	  (de	  Sousa,	  2007)	  
In	  an	  extended,	  metaphorical	   sense,	  however,	  standards	  of	  rationality	  can	  be	  
fruitfully	   applied	   to	   the	   domain	   of	   functionality,	   including	   biological	   adaptations	   and	  
artefacts,	  even	  when	  no	  intentionality	   is	   involved.	  Although	  natural	  selection	  is	  a	  mindless	  
process,	   it	   can	   produce	   an	   appearance	   of	   intentionality	   by	   crafting	   design	   solutions	   to	  
recurring	  adaptive	  problems	  (Williams,	  1966/1996).	  Evolution	  by	  natural	  selection	  gives	  rise	  
to	  what	  Dennett	  coined	  ‘free-­‐floating	  rationales’	  (Dennett,	  1983).	  In	  this	  extended	  sense	  of	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rationality,	   the	   relevant	   measure	   of	   success	   is	   equated	   with	   reproductive	   success	   or	  
inclusive	  fitness	  (Over,	  2000),	  and	  standard	  frameworks	  of	  rationality	  such	  as	  game	  theory	  
(Maynard	  Smith,	  1974)	  or	  expected	  utility	  theory	  (see	  3.2.)	  can	  be	  applied	  (Kacelnik,	  2006).	  	  
Because	  of	   the	  absence	  of	   intentionality,	  however,	  not	  all	  dimensions	  of	   full-­‐
blown	  rationality	  can	  be	  transferred	  to	  evolution.	  Whereas	  individual	  reasoners	  are	  capable	  
of	   foresight,	   evolution	   cannot	   look	   into	   the	   future.	   For	   example,	   selection	   can	   easily	   get	  
stuck	  on	   local	   peaks	   in	   an	   adaptive	   landscape,	   unable	   to	   reach	  nearby	  higher	   summits.	   If	  
evolution	  had	  the	  capacity	  of	  foresight,	  it	  would	  backtrack	  and	  make	  a	  detour,	  as	  a	  human	  
reasoner	  would.	  Evolution,	  therefore,	  provides	  a	  mere	  ‘simulacrum	  of	  rationality’	  (de	  Sousa,	  
2009).	  
	  
3.2	  Locus	  Shifts	  
Given	   that	   rationality	   (in	   the	   literal	   sense)	   can	  only	  be	  attributed	   to	  person-­‐level	  decision	  
making	   (see	   above),	  we	   question	  whether	   the	   ecological	   reframing	   succeeds	   in	   dispelling	  
the	  charge	  of	   irrationality.	   In	  order	   to	  get	   clear	  about	   the	  notion	  of	   ‘locus	   shifts’,	  we	   first	  
discuss	  an	  example	   from	  evolutionary	  psychology	   in	  which	  a	   similar	   calculus	  of	   rationality	  
may	   be	   implemented	   either	   at	   the	   individual	   level	   or	   on	   an	   evolutionary	   scale:	   error	  
management.	  This	  will	   allow	  us	   to	  pull	   apart	   the	   two	   loci	  of	   rationality,	  while	  holding	   the	  
measure	  of	  success	  (e.g.	  protection	  from	  bodily	  harm)	  constant.	  	  	  
Expected	   utility	   theory	   is	   one	   of	   the	   hallmarks	   of	   classical	   rationality:	   it	  
describes	   how	   to	   maximize	   utility	   under	   uncertainty,	   as	   a	   function	   of	   the	   probability	   of	  
different	  outcomes	  and	  their	  associated	  costs	  and	  benefits.	  Normally,	  the	  model	  is	  used	  to	  
describe	  individual	  choices,	  for	  example	  betting	  preferences.	  In	  recent	  years,	  however,	  the	  
logic	  of	  expected	  utility	   theory	  has	  been	  extended	   to	  evolutionary	  adaptations,	  under	   the	  
guise	  of	  error	  management	  theory	  (Haselton	  &	  Buss,	  2000;	  Haselton	  &	  Nettle,	  2006;	  Nesse,	  
2001).3	  In	  a	  range	  of	  different	  situations,	  organisms	  need	  to	  process	  ambiguous	  stimuli	  that	  
may	  or	  may	  not	  signal	  adaptively	  relevant	  situations,	  such	  as	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  predator	  or	  
pathogen.	  If	  the	  costs	  associated	  with	  the	  respective	  errors,	  measured	  in	  terms	  of	  (inclusive)	  
reproductive	  fitness,	  are	  asymmetric,	  then	  expected	  utility	  theory	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  predict	  
optimal	   behaviour.	   If	   the	   costs	   associated	   with	   one	   type	   of	   error	   are	   larger	   than	   those	  
associated	  with	  the	  opposite	  kind,	  then	  a	  strategy	  biased	  in	  favour	  of	  making	  the	  less	  costly	  
error	  may	   pay	   off	   in	   the	   long	   run,	   even	   if	   that	   increases	   the	   absolute	   numbers	   of	   errors	  
(Arkes,	  1991).	  As	  Haselton	  et	  al.	  put	   it:	   ‘it	   is	  better	  to	  make	  more	  errors	  overall	  as	   long	  as	  
they	  are	  of	  the	  relatively	  cheap	  kind’	  (Haselton	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  Error	  management	  is	  displayed	  
in	  a	   range	  of	  biological	  adaptations	   that	  are	  clearly	  beyond	  our	  voluntary	  control,	   such	  as	  
inflammation,	   disgust,	   fever	   and	   coughing.	   In	   all	   of	   these	   cases,	   the	   locus	  of	   rationality	   is	  
clearly	  evolution	  by	  natural	  selection,	  not	  the	  individual	  subject.	  	  
Things	   get	   more	   interesting	   when	   considering	   applications	   of	   error	  
management	  theory	  to	  human	  cognition.	   In	  such	  cases,	  the	  locus	  of	  rationality	  may	  reside	  
either	   at	   the	   individual	   level	   or	   at	   the	   evolutionary	   level.	   In	   most	   discussions	   of	   error	  
management,	   human	   behavioural	   biases	   are	   interpreted	   in	   terms	   of	   biased	   belief,	   with	  
evolution	   as	   the	   rational	   bookkeeper.	   For	   example,	   people	   buy	   into	   various	   superstitions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	   Here	   we	   ignore	   the	   point	   that	   error	   management	   theory	   is	   based	   on	   optimization,	   which	   would	   be	   a	  
problematic	  form	  of	  unbounded	  rationality	  in	  Gigerenzer’s	  framework.	  However,	  in	  this	  section	  we	  are	  simply	  




because	   they	  evolved	  pattern	  detection	  modules	   that	  err	  on	   the	   side	  of	   caution.	   In	  order	  
not	  to	  miss	  out	  on	  any	  important	  causal	  patterns	  in	  the	  world,	  evolution	  has	  ‘decided’	  to	  run	  
the	  risk	  of	  occasional	  false	  positives,	  which	  are	  mostly	  relatively	  harmless.	  	  
In	   a	   commentary	   on	   error	  management	   theory,	   however,	  McKay	  &	   Efferson	  
(2010)	  argued	   that	  human	  behavioural	  bias	  does	  not	  automatically	  entail	  biased	  belief.	   In	  
principle,	   the	   same	  behavioural	   bias	  may	  be	   arrived	   at	   through	   accurate	   belief	   formation	  
combined	   with	   judicious	   action	   policies,	   based	   on	   expected	   utility	   theory.	   If	   I	   react	   to	   a	  
rustle	  in	  the	  leaves	  as	  if	  there	  is	  a	  predator	  lurking	  in	  the	  bushes,	  I	  don’t	  need	  a	  strong	  belief	  
that	   a	   predator	   is	   there.	   Likewise,	  when	   approaching	   a	   girl	   that	   I	   like,	   I	   don’t	   need	   to	   be	  
certain	   that	  she	   fancies	  me.	   I	  may	  decide	  to	  act	  upon	  an	  admittedly	   remote	  possibility,	   in	  
light	  of	   the	  high	  opportunity	   costs	  associated	  with	   false	  negatives	   (ending	  up	  as	   lunch,	  or	  
missing	  a	  romantic	  –	  read	  reproductive	  –	  opportunity).	  As	  McKay	  &	  Efferson	  noted,	   ‘there	  
are	  infinitely	  many	  ways	  to	  accomplish	  the	  required	  behavioural	  change	  …	  inferences	  about	  
cognition	  can	  be	  radically	  underdetermined	  when	  one	  observes	  an	  interesting	  behavioural	  
bias.’	  (see	  also	  Marshall,	  Trimmer,	  Houston,	  &	  McNamara,	  2013;	  McKay	  &	  Efferson,	  2010).	  
The	   logic	   underlying	   the	   behavioural	   bias	   is	   the	   same,	   but	   our	   normative	  
appraisal	   of	   human	   reasoners	   depends	   on	   where	   the	   locus	   of	   rationality	   resides.	   If	   the	  
behavioural	  bias	   is	   the	  outcome	  of	  a	  prudential	   action	  policy,	  without	   the	   involvement	  of	  
biased	  belief,	  we	   should	  not	  accuse	   reasoners	  of	   irrationality.	   For	  example,	  people	   fasten	  
their	  seatbelts	  before	  starting	  the	  car	  not	  because	  they	  strongly	  believe	  they	  will	  crash	  into	  
other	   cars,	   but	   just	   because	   they	   would	   rather	   be	   safe	   than	   sorry:	   the	   cost	   of	   a	   false	  
negative	  (being	  flung	  through	  the	  windscreen)	  is	  orders	  of	  magnitude	  larger	  than	  that	  of	  a	  
false	  positive	  (the	  energy	  expended	   in	  fastening	  one’s	  seatbelt	  and	  the	  mild	  discomfort	  of	  
being	  strapped	  in	  it),	   large	  enough	  to	  offset	  the	  small	  probability	  of	  a	  serious	  car	  accident.	  
This	   is	   a	   case	   of	   full-­‐blown	   (intentional)	   rationality,	   situated	   at	   the	   level	   of	   individual	  
decision	   making.	   An	   alien	   scientist	   interpreting	   this	   prudential	   human	   behaviour	   as	   a	  
symptom	  of	  irrational	  paranoia	  would	  be	  very	  uncharitable	  indeed.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  a	  
behavioural	   bias	   stems	   from	   some	   attendant	   belief	   distortion,	   the	   charge	   of	   irrationality	  
may	  be	  apposite.	  For	  example,	  if	  an	  unattractive	  man	  approaches	  every	  woman	  at	  the	  bar,	  
believing	   that	   he	   is	   irresistible	   to	   the	   opposite	   sex,	   we	   may	   be	   justified	   in	   calling	   him	  
irrational.	  
If	   biased	   behaviour	   translates	   to	   bias	   in	   belief	   formation,	   however,	   with	  
evolution	  keeping	  the	  books	  of	  fitness	  costs	  and	  benefits,	  we	  think	  our	  assessment	  should	  
be	  different	  (for	  a	  discussion,	  see	  Galperin	  &	  Haselton,	  2012).	  From	  the	  adaptationist	  point	  
of	   view,	   the	   ecological	   ‘problem’	   of	   exploiting	   causal	   regularities	   in	   an	   organism’s	  
environment	   can	   be	   solved	   by	   different	   means:	   a	   fixed	   and	   genetically	   encoded	   action	  
sequence,	   the	   capacity	   to	   form	   conditional	   reflexes	   and	   make	   associations,	   a	   belief	  
formation	   system	  with	   a	   pre-­‐programmed	   belief	   bias,	   or	   the	   genuine	   capacity	   for	   causal	  
thought	   and	   expected	   utility	   reasoning	   (Dennett,	   1996;	   Lorenz,	   1941/2009).	   Only	   in	   the	  
latter	  case	  is	  rationality	  displayed	  at	  the	  locus	  of	  the	  individual	  decision-­‐maker.	  For	  example,	  
many	   people	   engage	   in	   superstitious	   rituals	   because	   they	   strongly	   believe	   in	   the	   causal	  
connection.	  If	  error	  management	  theorists	  are	  right,	  there	  is	  indeed	  method	  in	  the	  madness	  
of	  such	  superstition,	  since	  the	  fitness	  cost	  of	  overlooking	  causal	  links	  outweighs	  the	  fitness	  
cost	   of	   detecting	   non-­‐existent	   causal	   relationships.	   In	   such	   cases,	   however,	   the	   locus	   of	  
‘rationality’	   pertains	   to	   the	   adaptive	   design	   of	   our	   reasoning	   faculties.	   Although	   it	   is	  
tempting	   to	   collapse	   both	   levels	   of	   rationality,	   as	   though	   the	   adaptive	   rationale	   of	   our	  
superstitious	  behaviour	  redounds	  to	  the	  human	  reasoner,	  the	  ‘method’	  of	  natural	  selection	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does	   not	   obviate	   –	   indeed	   it	   requires	   –	   the	   ‘madness’	   of	   the	   individual.	   Accordingly,	   we	  
defend	  the	  following	  claims:	  
(a)	  We	  should	  not	  credit	  human	  reasoners	  simply	  because	  the	  adaptive	  design	  
of	  their	  reasoning	  faculties	  conforms	  to	  some	  standard	  principles	  of	  rationality.4	  We	  do	  not	  
congratulate	  people	  for	  their	  sophisticated	  immune	  systems	  or	  ingenious	  thermoregulation,	  
nor	  do	  we	  credit	  cicadas	  for	  having	  discovered	  prime	  numbers5,	  or	  spiders	  for	  the	  beautiful	  
geometry	  of	  their	  webs.	  There	  is	  neither	  cognitive	  transparency	  –	  the	  organism	  has	  no	  clue	  
why	  it	  behaves	  as	  it	  does	  –	  nor	  intentional	  action.	  According	  to	  Dennett,	  If	  we	  discover	  that	  
an	   animal	   is	   too	   simple-­‐minded	   to	   harbour	   an	   adaptive	   rationale,	   we	   do	   not	   discard	   the	  
rationale	   but	   are	   simply	   forced	   to	   ‘pass	   the	   rationale	   from	   the	   individual	   to	   the	   evolving	  
genotype’	  (Dennett,	  1983).	  
(b)	  Conversely,	  if	  we	  have	  good	  grounds	  for	  calling	  someone’s	  beliefs	  irrational	  
(see	   further),	   then	  merely	   pointing	   out	   the	   larger	   evolutionary	   rationale	   of	   the	   faculties	  
generating	  those	  beliefs	  will	  not	  get	  him	  off	  the	  hook.	  	  Having	  biologically	  adaptive	  cognition	  
is	   not	   an	   alibi	   where	   the	   charge	   of	   irrationality	   is	   concerned.	   If	   superstitious	   belief	   is	  
adaptive,	   because	   it	   motivates	   ‘better	   safe	   than	   sorry’	   behaviours,	   that	   does	   not	   make	  
superstitious	   people	   rational.	   For	   example,	   while	   people	   who	   believe	   that	   black	   cats	   are	  
harbingers	   of	   bad	   luck	   may	   be	   heeding	   to	   the	   ‘wisdom’	   of	   time-­‐honoured	   cognitive	  
adaptations,	  that	  does	  not	  make	  their	  belief	  rational	  or	  truth-­‐tracking.	  	  
	  
3.3	  The	  Rationality	  of	  Heuristics?	  	  
	  
3.3.1:	  Statistical	  Rationales	   In	   the	  classical	  heuristics-­‐and-­‐biases	   framework,	  heuristics	  are	  
perceived	  as	   imperfect	  shortcuts	   in	  an	  uncertain	  world,	  strategies	  that	  execute	  a	  trade-­‐off	  
between	   cost	   and	   accuracy.	   Gigerenzer	   and	   his	   colleagues,	   however,	   have	   documented	  
several	  cases	  where	  this	   trade-­‐off	  can	  be	  escaped,	  and	   ‘less	   information	  and	  computation	  
lead	   to	  more	   accurate	   judgments’	   (Gigerenzer	   &	   Sturm	   2012,	   p.	   261).	   The	   showpiece	   of	  
these	  ‘less	  is	  more’	  effects	  is	  the	  recognition	  heuristic,	  where	  people	  take	  advantage	  of	  their	  
own	  ignorance	  to	  make	  intelligent	  inferences.	  In	  judging	  which	  out	  of	  two	  cities	  has	  a	  larger	  
population,	  for	  example,	  people	  use	  name	  recognition	  as	  a	  cue	  for	  population	  level.	  When	  
the	   task	   consists	   of	   German	   cities,	   American	   subjects	   perform	   better	   than	   their	   German	  
colleagues,	  because	   the	   latter	   recognize	   too	  many	  cities	   to	  exploit	   their	  own	   ignorance.	  A	  
measure	  of	  ignorance	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  profitable	  in	  this	  case	  (Goldstein	  &	  Gigerenzer	  2002),	  
while	   knowing	   too	   much	   is	   a	   burden.	   Apparently,	   everyday	   life	   presents	   us	   with	   many	  
situations	   in	   which	   the	   recognition	   heuristic	   proves	   successful.	   It	   provides	   us	   with	   a	  
powerful	  and	  accurate	  tool	  for	  making	  inferences	  about	  the	  environment.	  
Fast	   and	   frugal	   heuristics	   escape	   a	   trade-­‐off	   between	   accuracy	   and	   speed	  
because	  ‘they	  make	  a	  trade-­‐off	  on	  another	  dimension:	  that	  of	  generality	  versus	  specificity’	  
(Gigerenzer	   &	   Todd	   1999,	   p.	   18).	   In	   later	   work,	   Gigerenzer	   and	   Brighton	   (2009)	   have	  
explored	  another	  dilemma	  (between	  bias	  and	  variance)	  for	  explaining	  when	  and	  why	  such	  
‘less-­‐is-­‐more’	  effects	  occur.	  The	  upshot	  of	  this	  statistical	  analysis	  is	  that	  the	  simplicity	  of	  fast	  
and	  frugal	  heuristics	  (few	  computational	  steps	  and	  few	  parameters)	  protects	  them	  against	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





overfitting	  (i.e.	  mistaking	  noise	  for	  underlying	  patterns)	  and	  hence	  ensures	  robustness	  in	  the	  
face	  of	  environmental	  change.	  
The	  success	  of	  the	  recognition	  heuristic	  derives	  from	  a	  probabilistic	  rationale.	  
In	  order	  for	  the	  trick	  to	  work,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  probability	  that	  
an	  item	  is	  recognized	  and	  the	  value	  of	  interest.	  This	  ‘recognition	  validity’	  needs	  to	  outweigh	  
the	   ‘knowledge	   validity’,	  which	   is	   the	   probability	   of	   giving	   the	   correct	   answer	  when	   both	  
items	  are	  recognized	  (Goldstein	  &	  Gigerenzer,	  1999,	  2002).	  In	  other	  words,	  your	  ignorance	  
must	   be	  more	   valuable	   than	   your	   knowledgeability.	   In	   addition,	   success	   depends	   on	   the	  
degree	   of	   uncertainty,	   the	   number	   of	   alternatives,	   and	   the	   size	   of	   the	   learning	   sample.	  
Goldstein	  &	  Gigerenzer	  conclude:	  	  
[M]any	  scholars,	  psychologists	  included,	  have	  mistrusted	  the	  power	  of	  these	  heuristic	  principles,	  and	  
saw	  in	  them	  simple-­‐mindedness	  and	  irrationality.	  This	  is	  not	  our	  view.	  The	  recognition	  heuristic	  is	  not	  
only	   a	   reasonable	   cognitive	   adaptation	  because	   there	   are	   situations	   of	   limited	   knowledge	   in	  which	  
there	   is	   little	   else	   one	   can	   do.	   It	   is	   also	   adaptive	   because	   there	   are	   situations	   …	   in	   which	  missing	  
information	   results	   in	   more	   accurate	   inferences	   than	   a	   considerable	   amount	   of	   knowledge	   can	  
achieve.	  (Gigerenzer	  &	  Todd,	  1999)	  
Now	  what	   should	  we	  make	  of	   this	   contrast	   between	   simple-­‐mindedness	   and	  
‘reasonable	  cognitive	  adaptation’?	  Can	  we	  attribute	  rationality	  to	  heuristic-­‐wielding	  human	  
thinkers	  when	  their	  heuristics	  yield	  accurate	  inferences?	  
	  
3.3.2:	   Cognitive	   Transparency	   The	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   depends	   on	   the	   criteria	   of	  
cognitive	  transparency	  and	   intentionality.	  As	  pointed	  out,	  attribution	  of	   (literal)	   rationality	  
requires	   intentional	   deliberation	  on	   the	  part	   of	   the	   actor,	   not	   just	   the	   execution	  of	   hard-­‐
wired	  action	  patterns	  or	  mindless	  heuristics.	  (cf.	  3.1	  Minimal	  conditions	  for	  rationality).	  To	  
avoid	   regress	   of	   justification,	   of	   course,	   we	   should	   not	   require	   that	   the	   agent	   has	  
contemplated	   every	   step	   in	   the	   chain	   of	   belief-­‐formation.	   Perceptual	   beliefs	   may	   arise	  
automatically,	  without	  deliberation	  and	  thus	  without	  rationality,	  but	  more	  complex	  beliefs	  
can	   be	   formed	   consciously	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   basic	   perceptual	   beliefs.	   On	   the	   latter	   level,	  
attributions	  of	  rationality	  and	  irrationality	  can	  be	  meaningfully	  made.6	  	  
Without	  delving	  into	  empirical	  details,	  we	  can	  be	  confident	  that	  many	  people	  
are	  ignorant	  of	  the	  statistical	  principles	  underlying	  the	  success	  of	  the	  recognition	  heuristic.	  
This	   is	   hardly	   surprising	   if	   the	   heuristic	   is	   a	   ‘cognitive	   adaptation’,	   as	   Goldstein	   and	  
Gigerenzer	   (2002)	   suggest.	   Many	   cognitive	   modules	   in	   our	   brain	   perform	   their	   proper	  
function	  without	  us	  having	  the	  slightest	  awareness	  of	  their	  operation,	  let	  alone	  their	  design	  
features	   and	   the	   reasons	   for	   their	   success.	   If	   the	   recognition	   heuristic	   is	   an	   evolved	  
adaptation,	   activated	   under	   appropriate	   circumstances	   by	   a	  mechanism	   to	   which	   human	  
cognizers	  have	  no	  access,	   it	  would	  be	  strange	  to	  credit	  people	  for	  its	  success.	  The	  locus	  of	  
rationality,	  in	  this	  case,	  is	  at	  the	  level	  of	  adaptation.	  Evolution,	  rather	  than	  human	  cognizers,	  
has	  exploited	  recurrent	  statistical	  correlations	  in	  the	  environment.	  	  
However,	   recent	   research	   shows	   that	   some	   people	   who	   use	   the	   heuristic	  
articulate	   a	   justification	   that	   captures	   the	   ecological	   validity	   (Gigerenzer,	   2007),	   and	   they	  
will	   suspend	   the	  use	  of	   the	  heuristic	   if	   they	  have	  good	  counter-­‐indications	   (Pachur,	  Todd,	  
Gigerenzer,	  Schooler,	  &	  Goldstein,	  2011).	  Even	  if	  such	  reasoners	  have	  no	  full	  understanding	  
of	  the	  statistical	  principles	  involved,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  criterion	  of	  transparency	  is	  satisfied,	  
and	  it	  would	  be	  uncharitable	  to	  deny	  them	  rationality	  at	  the	  personal	  level.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




In	  general,	  however,	  the	  evidence	  points	  in	  the	  other	  direction:	  
Research	   suggests	   that	   people	   hardly	   ever	   make	   conscious	   decisions	   about	   which	  
heuristic	   to	   use	   but	   that	   they	   quickly	   and	   unconsciously	   tend	   to	   adapt	   heuristics	   to	   changing	  
environments,	  provided	  there	  is	  feedback.	  (Gigerenzer,	  2008).	  
In	   another	   striking	   example	   from	   the	   catalogue	   of	   fast	   and	   frugal	   heuristics,	  
both	  humans	  and	  dogs	  use	  the	  following	  rule	  of	  thumb	  to	  catch	  a	  ball	   in	  flight:	  keep	  your	  
gaze	  fixed	  at	  the	  ball,	  and	  adjust	  your	  running	  speed	  such	  that	  the	  angle	  of	  the	  ball	  in	  your	  
visual	   field	   remains	   constant	   (Gigerenzer	   &	   Todd,	   1999).	   If	   baseball	   players	   are	   asked	   to	  
predict	   where	   a	   ball	   will	   land,	   but	   are	   not	   allowed	   to	   run	   towards	   it,	   they	   perform	   very	  
poorly	   (Babler	  &	  Dannemiller,	   1993).	  However,	  when	   asked	  how	   they	  proceed	   to	   catch	   a	  
ball	  on	  the	  fly,	  people	  are	  typically	  oblivious	  of	  using	  the	  heuristic:	  ‘most	  fielders	  are	  blithely	  
unaware	  of	   the	  gaze	  heuristic,	  despite	   its	   simplicity’	   (Gigerenzer,	  2007).	   This,	   it	   should	  be	  
emphasized,	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   heuristic-­‐wielding	   humans	   are	   irrational,	   but	   that	   the	  
normative	  categories	  of	  (ir)rationality	  simply	  do	  not	  apply	  insofar	  as	  humans	  are	  working	  on	  
automatic	  pilot.	  	  
Interestingly,	  on	  some	  occasions,	  Gigerenzer	  &	  Todd	  explicitly	  credit	  evolution	  
for	   the	   design	   of	   heuristics:	   ‘evolution	   would	   seize	   upon	   informative	   environmental	  
dependencies	  such	  as	  this	  one	  and	  exploit	  them	  with	  specific	  heuristics	  if	  they	  would	  give	  a	  
decision-­‐making	   organism	   an	   adaptive	   edge’	   (Gigerenzer	   and	   Todd	   1999,	   19).	   Such	  
statements,	   however,	   are	   in	   tension	   with	   the	   main	   thrust	   of	   their	   research	   programme,	  
which	   is	   to	   dispel	   accusations	   of	   ‘simple-­‐mindedness’	   and	   irrationality	   by	   pointing	   to	   the	  
larger	  ecological	  picture.	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  example	  of	  error	  management,	  adaptive	  design	  is	  
perfectly	  compatible	  with	  dumbness.	  
In	   this	   regard,	   the	   novel	   insights	   gleaned	   from	   Gigerenzer	   et	   al’s	   research	  
program	  conflict	  with	  their	  aspiration	  to	  rehabilitate	  human	  reason.	  Indeed,	  if	  the	  rationale	  
of	  the	  recognition	  heuristic	  or	  the	  gaze	  heuristic	  were	  transparent	  to	  those	  profiting	  from	  it,	  
the	   results	   of	  Gigerenzer	   et	   al.	  would	  not	   have	  been	   so	   informative.	   The	   effectiveness	   of	  
these	   heuristics	   is	   surprising	   even	   to	   the	   researchers	   themselves.	   For	   example,	   another	  
deceptively	   simple	   heuristic,	   ‘take	   the	   best’,	   which	   takes	   the	   first	   discriminative	   cue	  
between	   two	   items	   and	   ignores	   the	   other	   cues,	   has	   outperformed	   weighted	   statistical	  
decision	  procedures	  such	  as	  multiple	  regression.	  This	  is	  how	  Gigerenzer	  &	  Goldstein	  relate	  
their	  amazement	  at	   their	  own	  result:	   ‘When	  we	  first	  obtained	  these	  results,	  we	  could	  not	  
believe	  them.’	  (Gigerenzer	  &	  Todd,	  1999).	  
	  
Because	   people	   use	   their	   heuristics	  without	   cognitive	   transparency,	   they	   are	  
also	   often	   insensitive	   to	   local	   conditions	   where	   their	   heuristics	   lead	   them	   astray.7	   For	  
example,	   many	   advertisers	   exploit	   the	   recognition	   heuristic	   by	   investing	   in	   brand	  
recognition	  rather	  than	  product	  quality,	  thereby	  undermining	  the	  ecological	  validity	  of	  the	  
correlation	  between	  renown	  and	  product	  quality	  and	  fooling	  consumers.	   In	   the	   ‘overnight	  
fame’	  experiments	  by	  Jacoby	  et	  al.	   (Jacoby,	  Kelley,	  Brown,	  &	  Jasechko,	  1989),	  people	  who	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Intelligent	  choice	  in	  the	  face	  of	  contingencies	  is	  one	  of	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  rationality.	  Perhaps	  people	  do	  not	  
fully	  understand	  why	  the	  heuristics	  they	  employ	  work,	  but	  they	  may	  know	  when	  to	  implement	  them.	  In	  
particular,	  they	  may	  make	  flexible	  use	  of	  the	  different	  tools	  in	  their	  mental	  toolkit,	  switching	  strategies	  in	  the	  
face	  of	  local	  circumstances	  and	  feedback.	  This	  interesting	  empirical	  issue	  is	  still	  under	  investigation.	  Although	  
research	  suggests	  that	  people	  adapt	  their	  heuristics	  to	  the	  local	  situation	  and	  to	  performance	  feedback	  
through	  a	  process	  of	  reinforcement	  learning	  (Rieskamp	  and	  Otto	  2006),	  that	  does	  not	  prevent	  heuristics	  from	  
overshooting	  or	  being	  misapplied.	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had	  been	  presented	  with	  unknown	  names	  the	  day	  before	  were	  tricked	   into	  believing	   that	  
those	  names	  were	  famous.	  This	  should	  not	  come	  as	  a	  surprise.	  Evolution	  exploits	  recurring	  
statistical	   properties	   of	   the	   environment	   of	   evolutionary	   adaptiveness	   (EEA),	   but	   it	   is	   not	  
responsive	  to	  any	  environmental	  contingency.	  For	  evolution	  it	  is	  ‘rational’	  to	  implement	  the	  
recognition	   heuristic	   in	   an	   organism	   as	   long	   as	   overshooting	   or	   misfiring	   has	   been	  
sufficiently	  rare	  or	  inconsequential	  in	  the	  EEA.	  Error	  management	  on	  the	  evolutionary	  scale	  
abstracts	  away	  from	  local	  contingencies.	  
	  
3.4	  Why	  Adaptive	  ‘Rationality’	  Does	  Not	  Align	  with	  Personal	  Rationality	  	  
In	   the	   section	   on	   error	   management,	   we	   noted	   that	   adaptively	   ‘rational’	   cognition	   may	  
translate	   into	   irrational	  belief,	   such	  as	   superstition.	  There	  are	   two	  additional	   reasons	  why	  
evolutionary	   rationality	   and	   personal	   rationality	   may	   diverge.	   The	   first	   is	   the	   so-­‐called	  
problem	   of	   adaptive	   mismatch.	   If	   heuristics	   are	   evolved	   adaptations	   for	   managing	   cost	  
asymmetries	   in	  the	  EEA,	  there	   is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  the	  same	  balance	  sheet	  still	  applies	  to	  
modern	   environments.	   Probabilities	   may	   have	   changed	   over	   time,	   as	   may	   have	   the	  
respective	   costs	   and	   benefits.	   This	   mismatch	   hypothesis	   is	   one	   of	   the	   main	   tenets	   of	  
evolutionary	  psychology	  (Pinker,	  1997;	  Tooby	  &	  Cosmides,	  1994).8	  A	  heuristic	  may	  succeed	  
in	  the	  EEA	  but	  fail	  in	  modern	  environments,	  or	  only	  match	  some	  limited	  aspects	  of	  modern	  
environments	  (e.g.	  to	  predict	  which	  city	  will	  have	  the	  largest	  population).	  	  
A	  second	  reason	  concerns	  the	  issue	  of	  who	  	  –	  or	  rather	  what	  –	  is	  the	  ultimate	  
beneficiary	  of	  natural	   selection	   (cui	  bono?	  Dennett,	  1995).	  As	  Dawkins	   (1976)	  has	  pointed	  
out,	   following	  up	  on	  pioneering	  work	  by	  Williams	  and	  Hamilton	   (Hamilton	  1963;	  Williams	  
1966/1996),	   genes	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   the	   ultimate	   beneficiaries	   of	   evolutionary	   adaptation.	  
Individual	   organisms	   are	   best	   seen	   as	   ‘vehicles’	   for	   genetic	   propagation	   (Dawkins	   1982).	  
Take,	  for	  instance,	  the	  suicidal	  sting	  of	  a	  bee.	  Such	  behaviour	  is	  ‘rational’	  from	  the	  point	  of	  
the	  evolutionary	  processes	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  such	  behaviour,	  because	  the	  bee	  shares	  75%	  of	  
its	   genes	   with	   its	   sisters.	   Sacrificing	   its	   life	   to	   enhance	   the	   survival	   chances	   of	   the	   hive	  
therefore	  makes	  sense	  from	  a	  gene-­‐centric	  perspective.	  But	  it	  certainly	  does	  not	  benefit	  the	  
individual	  bee.	  Evolutionary	   rationality	  –	  which	   is	   situated	  at	   the	   level	  of	   the	   replicators	  –	  
therefore	  does	  not	  always	  coincide	  with	  rationality	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  vehicle	  (Skyrms	  1996,	  
Stanovich	  &	  West	  2000,	  2003).	  	  
	  
4.	  Genuine	  Fallacies	  
	  
Let	   us	   now	   have	   a	   closer	   look	   at	   two	   famous	   examples	   from	   the	   irrationality	   literature,	  
where	  advocates	  of	  ecological	  rationality	  have	  performed	  a	  locus	  shift:	  the	  gambler’s	  fallacy	  
and	  the	  hot	  hand	  fallacy.	  The	  former	  refers	   to	  the	  belief	  of	   roulette	  players	   that	  numbers	  
which	  have	  not	   turned	  up	  yet	  are	  more	   likely	   to	  win	   in	   the	  next	   round,	  because	   they	  are	  
‘overdue’.	  In	  reality,	  of	  course,	  each	  turn	  of	  the	  roulette	  wheel	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  next.	  
The	  wheel	  has	  no	  memory,	  so	  the	  probability	  distribution	  remains	  the	  same	  at	  every	  trial.	  
More	   generally,	   the	   gambler’s	   fallacy	   describes	   the	   belief	   that	   statistical	   deviations	   in	   a	  
given	  direction	  will	  soon	  be	  counterbalanced	  by	  deviations	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Standard	  examples	  of	  mismatch	  include	  our	  craving	  for	  fat	  and	  sugar	  (leading	  to	  widespread	  obesity),	  or	  our	  
disproportionate	   fear	   of	   spiders	   (given	   that	   very	   few	   people	   succumb	   to	   spider	   bites),	   compared	   to	   our	  
carelessness	  about	  moving	  cars	  and	  electricity	  sockets	  (which	  are	  far	  more	  hazardous).	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The	  hot	  hand	  fallacy	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  mirror	  image	  of	  the	  gambler’s	  fallacy.	  
To	  commit	  the	  hot	  hand	  fallacy	  is	  to	  believe	  that,	   if	  some	  deviation	  from	  chance	  has	  been	  
observed,	  further	  deviations	  in	  the	  same	  direction	  are	  more	  likely	  on	  subsequent	  trials.	  The	  
name	  derives	  from	  basketball,	  where	  there	   is	  a	  widespread	  belief	  among	  players	  and	  fans	  
that	   players	   score	   in	   streaks	   (Gilovich,	   1983;	   Gilovich,	   Vallone,	   &	   Tversky,	   1985).	   If	   one	  
player	  has	  already	  scored	  well,	  he	  has	  a	  ‘hot	  hand’	  and	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  further	  points	  
during	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  game.	  If	  he	  makes	  a	  bad	  start,	  however,	  there	  is	  a	  jinx	  on	  him	  and	  he	  
will	   be	   less	   likely	   to	   perform	   well	   during	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   match.	   Statistical	   analyses	   of	  
basketball	  scoring	  data	  have	  revealed	  no	  such	  clustering	  (but	  see	  Raab,	  Gula,	  &	  Gigerenzer,	  
2012for	  evidence	  of	  streakiness	  in	  volleyball),	  but	  belief	  in	  the	  hot	  hand	  persists.9	  	  
The	   fact	   that	  each	  of	   these	   forms	  of	   inference	  has	  been	  bestowed	   its	  proper	  
label	   in	   the	   literature,	   despite	   their	   being	   one	   another’s	   mirror	   image,	   is	   a	   source	   of	  
amusement	   to	   Gigerenzer	   and	   his	   colleagues.	   For	   them,	   it	   exemplifies	   the	   bad	   habit	   of	  
psychologists	  to	  label	  any	  observed	  deviation	  from	  accepted	  rationality	  models	  as	  a	  ‘fallacy’	  
or	  ‘bias’,	  without	  any	  understanding	  of	  the	  underlying	  cognitive	  mechanisms	  (Gigerenzer	  &	  
Brighton,	  2009).	  	  
Are	   these	   unflattering	   labels	   justified?	   Steven	   Pinker	   has	   argued	   that	   the	  
gambler’s	  fallacy	  is	  not	  really	  a	  fallacy,	  because	  in	  most	  natural	  environments,	  a	  succession	  
of	  events	  is	  not	  statistically	  independent:	  the	  probability	  of	  an	  event	  changes	  in	  function	  of	  
earlier	  occurrences.	  
Many	   events	   work	   like	   that.	   They	   have	   a	   characteristic	   life	   history,	   a	   changing	  
probability	  of	  occurring	  over	  time	  which	  statisticians	  call	  a	  hazard	  function.	  An	  astute	  observer	  should	  
commit	  the	  gambler’s	  fallacy	  and	  try	  to	  predict	  the	  next	  occurrence	  of	  an	  event	  from	  its	  history	  so	  far	  
…	  (Pinker,	  1997)	  
Roulette	   wheels,	   with	   their	   smooth	   and	   radially	   symmetric	   design,	   are	  
expressly	  designed	  to	  foil	  this	  heuristic,	  according	  to	  Pinker:	  ‘in	  any	  world	  without	  casinos,	  
the	   gambler’s	   fallacy	   is	   rarely	   a	   fallacy’	   (ibid.).	   Indeed,	   our	   ability	   to	   spot	   statistical	  
dependencies	   between	   events	   in	   real-­‐life	  may	   often	   prove	   very	   useful.	   That	  morale	   even	  
holds	  for	  chance	  games	  outside	  the	  idealized	  world	  of	  casinos.	  If	  I	  play	  a	  dice	  game	  at	  a	  fair	  
and	   the	  dice	   land	  on	  12	  a	  couple	  of	   times	   in	  a	   row,	   it	   is	  not	  unreasonable	   to	  predict	   that	  
they	  will	  do	  so	  the	  next	  time	  too	  –	  because	  they	  are	  probably	  rigged.	  In	  general,	  as	  Bennis	  et	  
al.	   have	   written,	   ‘casino	   games	   [are]	   exquisitely	   designed	   to	   exploit	   otherwise	   adaptive	  
heuristics	  to	  the	  casino’s	  advantage’	  (Bennis,	  Katsikopoulos,	  Goldstein,	  Dieckmann,	  &	  Berg,	  
2009).	   Taleb	   (2008)	   has	   referred	   to	   the	   inappropriate	   application	   of	   pure	   and	   simplified	  
models	  of	  probability	   to	   real	   life	  as	   the	   ‘ludic	   fallacy’.	   Intuitions	   that	   lead	  us	  astray	   in	   the	  
rarefied	  and	  idealized	  world	  of	  casinos,	  may	  prove	  very	  useful	  in	  real-­‐life	  situations.	  	  
If	   I	   am	  presented	  with	   some	   strange	  device	   that	   churns	   out	   black	   and	  white	  
balls,	  and	  I	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  its	  inner	  working,	  I	  may	  be	  forgiven	  for	  thinking	  that	  there	  
is	  a	  statistical	  dependence	  between	  different	  trials.	  I	  may	  even	  be	  perfectly	  justified	  in	  doing	  
so,	  extrapolating	  from	  earlier	  experience.	  An	  experienced	  gambler	  in	  a	  casino,	  by	  contrast,	  
possesses	  all	  the	  requisite	  evidence	  he	  needs	  to	  conclude	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  machine	  to	  which	  
his	  pattern	  detection	  heuristics	  will	  apply.	   If	  even	  a	  crash	  course	   in	  statistics	  and	  a	  careful	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	   It	   is	   worth	   pointing	   out	   that	   the	   hot	   hand	   hypothesis	   is	   not	   per	   se	   implausible,	   and	   certainly	   would	   not	  
overthrow	  our	  current	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  (as	  with	  the	  gambler’s	  fallacy).	  Maybe	  players	  who	  start	  a	  
game	  well	   get	   a	   boost	   of	   confidence,	   and	   those	  who	   start	   out	   badly	   experience	  more	   stress,	  which	   further	  
lowers	  their	  performance.	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inspection	  of	  the	  roulette	  wheel	  fail	  to	  cure	  him	  of	  his	  habit	  of	  thought,	  then	  we	  may,	  pace	  
Pinker,	  call	  his	  reasoning	  fallacious.	  
The	  natural	  way	  to	  construe	  Pinker’s	  argument	  is	  as	  a	  point	  about	  adaptation.	  
Given	  that	  pure	  randomness	   is	  rare	   in	  the	  EEA	  (as	   it	  most	  probably	  still	   is	  today	  in	  natural	  
environments),	  it	  made	  sense	  for	  evolution	  to	  endow	  us	  with	  a	  knack	  for	  spotting	  patterns,	  
with	  the	  minor	  side-­‐effect	  of	  making	  us	  vulnerable	  to	  (fair)	  dice	  games	  and	  roulette	  wheels.	  
After	   enduring	   five	   straight	   days	   of	   rainy	  weather,	   as	   Pinker	   notices,	   it	  would	  have	  made	  
sense	  for	  the	  optimistic	  early	  hominid	  to	  expect	  a	  sunny	  spell.	  As	  weather	  fluctuation	  often	  
follows	  statistical	  patterns,	  the	  sun	  can	  really	  be	  ‘overdue’.	  For	  evolution,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  
‘gamble’	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  environments	  with	  a	  specific	  hazard	  function,	  and	  to	  disregard	  the	  
abstractions	  of	  casino	  wheels,	  which	  did	  not	  feature	  in	  ancestral	  environments.	  In	  a	  similar	  
vein,	  the	  hot	  hand	  fallacy	  may	  arise	  from	  a	  heuristic	  adapted	  to	  environments	  with	  positive	  
temporal	  autocorrelation	  or	  ‘clumping’	  (Fawcett	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Wilke	  &	  Barrett,	  2009)	  
But	   what	   does	   that	   say	   about	   us?	   Are	   we	   forgiven	   for	   using	   the	   heuristic	  
anyway,	  even	   in	   the	   face	  of	  countervailing	   information?	  Personal-­‐level	   rationality	   involves	  
the	   ability	   to	   use	   contingent	   information	   about	   the	   problem	   task	   in	   order	   to	   understand	  
which	   strategies	   are	   conducive	   to	   success.	   A	   rational	   person	   should	   reflect	   upon	   the	  
deliverances	  of	  her	   intuitions	  and	  rules	  of	   thumb,	  and	  disregard	  them	  when	  she	  has	  good	  
reasons	   to	   believe	   that	   they	   lead	   her	   astray	   (Over,	   2000).	   Irrationality	   often	   stems	   from	  
what	  Fiedler	  and	  Wänke	  (2004;	  2013)	  have	  called	   ‘meta-­‐cognitive	  myopia’,	  or	  the	   inability	  
to	  critically	  evaluate	  intuitive	  heuristics	  and	  use	  them	  in	  appropriate	  settings.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
casinos,	   there	   is	   indeed	   an	   alternative	   course	   of	   action	   available.	   Many	   experienced	  
gamblers,	  though	  still	  feeling	  the	  intuitive	  pull	  of	  the	  pattern-­‐seeking	  heuristic,	  suppress	  or	  
resist	   it	   in	  practice,	  because	   they	  realize	   that	   the	  wheel	  has	  no	  memory	  and	  every	   turn	   is	  
independent	  of	  all	  the	  others.	  Surely	  (Dennett,	  2013)	  such	  players	  are	  more	  ‘rational’	  than	  
the	   ones	   who	   succumb	   to	   the	   gambler’s	   fallacy,	   in	   all	   of	   the	   senses	   we	   explored:	   they	  
understand	   the	   justification	  of	   their	  beliefs,	   they	   intentionally	   aim	   for	   a	   specific	   goal,	   and	  
they	   will	   be	   more	   successful	   in	   attaining	   it.	   Indeed,	   one	   of	   the	   hallmarks	   of	   (human)	  
rationality	   is	   our	   ability	   to	   reflectively	   evaluate	   and	   cross-­‐validate	   the	   output	   of	   our	  
cognitive	  modules,	  and	  to	  overrule	  their	   intuitive	  hunches	  when	  the	  context	  calls	   for	   it.	   In	  
this	  regard,	  whereas	  Pinker	  emphasises	  that	  the	  gambler’s	  fallacy	  is	  not	  a	  fallacy	  in	  a	  world	  
without	  casinos,	  we	  emphasize	  that	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  a	  fallacy	  in	  a	  world	  with	  casinos.	  
As	  de	  Sousa	  points	  out,	  the	  rational	  ‘strategies’	  attributed	  to	  natural	  selection	  
are	   conceived	   in	   the	  most	   general	   terms,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   phylogenetic	   ‘experiences’	   and	  
without	  precise	  reference	  to	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  they	  may	  be	  implemented.	  By	  
contrast,	   individual	   rational	   agents	   face	   particular	   problems	   in	   possibly	   unique	  
circumstances	   (de	   Sousa,	   2007).	   Rationality,	   in	   this	   perspective,	   consists	   of	   using	   our	  
reasoning	   abilities	   appropriately	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   situation	   at	   hand,	   not	   blindly	   following	  
heuristics	  of	  which	  –	  with	  hindsight	  –	  we	  can	  appreciate	  the	  adaptive	  rationale.	  
	  
5.	  Ecological	  Rationality	  Restored	  
	  
5.1.	  Conjunction	  Fallacy?	  
Does	   the	  program	  of	  ecological	   rationality	  always	   involve	   locus	  shifts,	  and	   their	  attendant	  
problems	   of	   transparency	   and	   intentionality?	   No.	   The	   second	   strand	   of	   the	   program	   of	  
“ecological	   rationality”	   (section	   2.2),	   does	   not	   depend	   on	   adaptive	   considerations,	   and	  
hence	  does	  not	  involve	  locus	  shifts.	  The	  ‘ecological’	  dimension	  of	  rationality,	  in	  this	  strand,	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concerns	  the	  real-­‐life	  contexts	  of	  human	  reasoning,	  which	  are	  typically	  truncated	  in	  artificial	  
lab	   experiments.	   To	   illustrate	   this	   difference,	   we	   will	   briefly	   consider	   two	   examples	   of	  
alleged	   human	   bias	   that	   have	   been	   reinterpreted	   under	   the	   banner	   of	   “ecological	  
rationality”,	   but	  which	   do	  not	   involve	   adaptive	   locus	   shifts	   and	  which	   satisfy	   the	  minimal	  
requirements	  of	  personal-­‐level	  rationality.	  Consider	  the	  following	  classic	  test:	  
Linda	  is	  31	  years	  old,	  single,	  outspoken,	  and	  very	  bright.	  She	  majored	  in	  philosophy.	  
As	   a	   student,	   she	   was	   deeply	   concerned	   with	   issues	   of	   discrimination	   and	   social	  
justice,	  and	  also	  participated	  in	  anti-­‐nuclear	  demonstrations.	  
Which	  is	  more	  probable?	  
(A)	   Linda	  is	  a	  bank	  teller.	  
(B)	   Linda	  is	  a	  bank	  teller	  and	  is	  active	  in	  the	  feminist	  movement.	  
In	   their	   original	   research	   on	   what	   became	   known	   as	   the	   ‘Linda	   problem’,	  
Kahneman	  &	  Tversky	  held	  human	  reasoners	  accountable	  to	  the	  conjunction	  rule:	  B	  cannot	  
be	   more	   probable	   than	   A,	   because	   it	   is	   an	   accepted	   rule	   of	   probability	   theory	   that	   the	  
conjunction	  of	  two	  events	  can	  never	  be	  more	  probable	  than	  either	  of	  its	  members.	  Still,	  the	  
majority	  of	  subjects	  answered	  B.	  	  
Gigerenzer,	  however,	  pointed	  out	  that	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘and’	  and	  ‘probable’	  are	  
polysemous.	   ‘Probable’	   can	   also	   mean	   plausible,	   sensible,	   or	   supported	   by	   evidence	  
(Gigerenzer,	   1996;	   Hertwig	  &	  Gigerenzer,	   1999).	   Kahneman	  &	   Tversky	   expect	   subjects	   to	  
interpret	   ‘probable’	   in	   the	   sense	  of	  mathematical	  probability.	  As	  a	  number	  of	   researchers	  
have	  pointed	  out,	  however	  (Adler,	  1984;	  Dulany	  &	  Hilton,	  1991;	  Hilton,	  1995),	  this	  construal	  
violates	   pragmatic	   rules	   of	   conversational	   inference,	   in	   particular	   the	  maxim	  of	   relevance	  
(Grice,	   1989).	   According	   to	   this	   maxim,	   it	   makes	   little	   sense	   to	   adopt	   the	   notion	   of	  
mathematical	   probability	   in	   answering	   the	   Linda	   problem,	   given	   all	   the	   additional	   (and	  
hence	   presumably	   relevant)	   information	   presented.	   If	   subjects	   interpret	   the	   task	   as	  
Kahneman	  &	  Tversky	  want	  them	  to,	  the	   little	  vignette	  about	  Linda	   is	  rendered	  completely	  
irrelevant	  to	  the	  task,	  and	  the	  ‘correct’	  answer	  depends	  solely	  on	  the	  logical	  operator	  ‘AND’	  
and	   the	  mathematical	  meaning	  of	   ‘probable’.	  Why	  would	   the	   researcher	   present	   such	   an	  
elaborate	  description	  of	  Linda’s	  character	  and	  background,	  if	  it	  were	  completely	  irrelevant?	  
In	  addition,	   subjects	   can	   reasonably	   interpret	   the	   first	   statement	  as	   implying	   that	   Linda	   is	  
not	  active	  in	  the	  feminist	  movement.	  These	  ambiguities	  can	  be	  ruled	  out	  by	  presenting	  the	  
task	   in	   terms	   of	   natural	   frequencies,	   or	   by	   including	   another	   question	   that	   makes	   the	  
description	   of	   Linda	   relevant,	   so	   that	   the	   (overall)	   task	   does	   not	   violate	   the	   maxim	   of	  
relevance.	  After	  such	  modifications,	  as	  it	  turns	  out,	  subjects	  reason	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
conjunction	   rule	   (Hertwig	   &	   Gigerenzer,	   1999).10	   Given	   that	   simple	   application	   of	   the	  
conjunction	  rule	  glosses	  over	  the	  conversational	  subtleties	  and	  ambiguities	  of	  the	  situation,	  
a	  number	  of	  critics	  have	  argued	   that	  Kahneman	  &	  Tversky’s	   interpretation	   is	  uncharitable	  
(e.g.	  Margolis,	   1987),	   and	  even	   that	   they,	   and	  not	   their	   subjects,	   have	   failed	   to	  grasp	   the	  
logic	   of	   the	   Linda	   problem	   (Hertwig	  &	  Gigerenzer,	   1999):	   ‘human	   intelligence	   reaches	   far	  
beyond	  narrow	  logical	  norms.	   In	  fact,	  the	  conjunction	  problems	  become	  trivial	  and	  devoid	  
of	  intellectual	  challenge	  when	  people	  finally	  realize	  that	  they	  are	  intended	  as	  a	  content-­‐free	  
logical	  exercise’	  (Gigerenzer,	  2008).	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  However,	  in	  Kahneman’s	  defense,	  other	  experiments	  show	  that,	  even	  if	  the	  Linda	  problem	  is	  presented	  in	  a	  
frequency	  format,	  which	  is	  reputedly	  ecologically	  valid,	  biased	  reasoning	  does	  sometimes	  –	  though	  not	  always	  
–	  persist.	  (Mellers,	  Hertwig,	  &	  Kahneman,	  2001).	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5.2.	  Base	  Rate	  Fallacy?	  
Another	   case	   of	   alleged	   irrationality	   that	   (at	   least	   partly)	   disappears	   when	   cast	   in	   an	  
appropriate	   real	   world	   environment,	   instead	   of	   an	   artificial	   and	  misleading	   set-­‐up,	   is	   the	  
infamous	   base	   rate	   fallacy	   (Casscells,	   Schoenberger,	   &	   Graboys,	   1978;	   Kahneman	   et	   al.,	  
1982).	   For	   example,	   when	   estimating	   the	   probability	   that	   a	   patient	   has	   contracted	   a	  
particular	  disease,	  physicians	  are	  (sometimes)	  found	  to	  ignore	  the	  base	  rate	  of	  the	  disease	  
in	  question.	  Information	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  test	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  sole	  determinant	  
of	  their	  judgment,	  while	  the	  statistical	  prevalence	  of	  the	  disease	  in	  the	  population	  group	  is	  
ignored.	  
However,	  as	  Gigerenzer	  noted,	  real	  life	  is	  more	  complicated:	  
Clinicians,	   however,	   know	   that	   patients	   are	   usually	   not	   randomly	   selected—except	   in	   large	   survey	  
studies—but	   rather	   ‘select’	   themselves	   by	   exhibiting	   symptoms	   of	   the	   disease.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	  
random	  sampling,	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  to	  do	  with	  the	  base	  rates	  speciﬁed.	  (Gigerenzer,	  1991)	  	  
If	  patients	  are	  not	  randomly	  sampled,	  Gigerenzer	  notes,	  physicians	  cannot	  be	  
accused	  of	  committing	  the	  base	  rate	  fallacy.	  Indeed,	  given	  that	  real	  world	  environments,	  as	  
opposed	  to	  convenient	  mathematical	  idealizations,	  do	  not	  typically	  proffer	  random	  samples,	  
the	  judgment	  of	  the	  clinicians	  is	  perfectly	  defensible.	  In	  a	  series	  of	  experiments	  conducted	  
by	  Gigerenzer	  and	  colleagues	  (1988),	  people	  were	  found	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  factoring	  in	  base	  
rates,	   provided	   they	   were	   ‘convinced’	   that	   the	   sample	   was	   randomly	   drawn	   from	   the	  
population.	  Inviting	  subjects	  to	  blindly	  draw	  patients’	  names	  from	  an	  urn	  proved	  effective	  in	  
overruling	  their	  prior	  beliefs,	  whereas	  merely	  pointing	  out	  random	  sampling	  in	  the	  problem	  
description	  did	  not.	  	  
Even	   though	   non-­‐random	   sampling	   appears	   to	   be	   an	   intuitive	   default	  
assumption,	   these	   experiments	   show	   that	   people	   can	   and	   will	   –	   given	   sufficient	  
commitment	   –	   account	   for	   base	   rates	  when	   necessary.	   Indeed,	   as	  Gigerenzer	   points	   out,	  
with	   Tooby	   and	   Cosmides	   (1996),	   the	   neglect	   of	   base	   rate	   information	   is	   by	   no	  means	   a	  
systematic	  defect	  of	  human	  reasoning,	  as	  the	  label	   ‘base	  rate	  fallacy’	  suggests.	   If	  Bayesian	  
problems	   are	   couched	   in	   terms	   of	   frequencies,	   as	   opposed	   to	   abstract	   mathematical	  
probability,	   it	   turns	  out	  that	   the	   ‘fallacy’	   largely	  disappears	   (but	  see	  Kahneman	  &	  Tversky,	  
1996;	  Sloman,	  Over,	  Slovak,	  &	  Stibel,	  2003).	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  not	  that	  most	  people	  lack	  
the	   requisite	   skills	   to	   integrate	   base	   rate	   information	   (Zhu	  &	  Gigerenzer,	   2006).	   Provided	  
that	   there	   is	   sufficiently	   strong	   indication	   of	   random	   sampling,	   and	   that	   base	   rate	  
information	   is	   presented	   in	   a	   concrete,	   accessible	   way,	   people’s	   reasoning	   approximates	  
Bayesian	   theory	   (Cosmides	   &	   Tooby,	   1996;	   Gigerenzer	   &	   Hoffrage,	   1995).	   Once	   again,	  
Gigerenzer	  and	  colleagues	  argue	  that	  the	  ‘fallacy’	  is	  elicited	  by	  the	  artificial	  or	  experimental	  
set-­‐ups,	  and	  evaporates	  when	  transferred	  to	  real	   life.	   It	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  whether	  
and	   to	  what	   extent	   the	   conjunction	   and	  base	   rate	   fallacies	   disappear	  when	  problems	   are	  
presented	   in	  ecologically	  valid	   formats	   is	   still	  hotly	  debated.	  This,	  however,	   is	  a	  matter	  of	  
experimental	   psychology.	   The	   point	  we	   are	  making	   is	  merely	   that	   the	   approach	   taken	   in	  
these	  cases	  does	  not	  involve	  a	  problematic	  locus	  shift.	  
	  
5.3	  Analysis	  
Wherein	  lies	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  latter	  cases	  and	  the	  problematic	  ones	  we	  discussed	  
earlier,	  given	  that	  both	  involve	  a	  form	  of	  ‘ecological’	  reframing?	  In	  Gigerenzer’s	  deflation	  of	  
the	  ‘conjunction	  fallacy’	  or	  the	  ‘base	  rate	  fallacy’,	  the	  gestalt	  switch	  also	  involves	  adopting	  a	  
broader	   view,	   casting	   human	   inference-­‐making	   in	   a	   rich	   and	   real	   world	   environment.	   In	  
these	   examples,	   however,	   the	   force	   of	   the	   ecological	   gestalt	   switch	   derives	   not	   from	  any	  
shift	   to	   the	  adaptive	   rationale	  of	   their	  heuristics,	  but	   from	  the	   fact	   that	  human	   reasoners	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had	   not	   been	   given	   sufficient	   information	   to	   disambiguate	   the	   problem	   at	   hand	   and	   to	  
home	  in	  on	  the	   interpretation	   intended	  by	  the	  experiments.	   In	  particular,	  subjects	  did	  not	  
know	   –	   or	   were	   not	   properly	   committed	   to	   the	   belief	   –	   that	   they	   were	   dealing	   with	   an	  
artificial	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  normal	  richness	  and	  ecological	  complexity	  of	  problem	  solving	  
should	  be	  ignored.1	  How	  were	  Kahneman	  &	  Tversky’s	  subjects	  supposed	  to	  know	  that	  their	  
experimenters	  were	  interested	  in	  a	  ‘silly’	  question	  that	  violates	  an	  accepted	  rule	  of	  sensible	  
conversation?	  Why	  should	  they	  have	  interpreted	  the	  problem	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  mathematical	  
probability,	   contra	   their	   intuition	   that	   this	  made	   the	  whole	   story	   about	   Linda	   irrelevant?	  
Similarly,	  why	  should	  the	  physicians	  have	  realized	  they	  were	  expected	  to	  take	  a	  step	  back	  
from	   their	   regular	  practice,	   considering	  an	  unrealistic	   case	   in	  which	  a	   subject	   is	   randomly	  
drawn	   from	   the	  population	   at	   large.	   Remember	   that,	  when	  Gigerenzer	   (1991)	   committed	  
subjects	  to	  the	  mathematical	   interpretation,	  their	  reasoning	  conformed	  to	  the	  conjunction	  
rule.	  The	  force	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  ecological	  rationality	  here	   is	  not	  that	   ‘we	  can	  design	  
experiments	   in	   which	   cognitive	   illusions	   disappear’	   (Kahneman,	   2003),	   as	   Kahneman	  




In	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   strengths	   and	   frailties	   of	   human	   reason	   within	   a	   naturalized	  
framework,	  an	  evolutionary	  perspective	  is	  invaluable.	  We	  applaud	  the	  program	  of	  ecological	  
rationality	   for	   taking	   the	  evolutionary	   roots	  of	   (human)	   cognition	   seriously.	   If	  one	   tries	   to	  
dispel	  apparent	  instances	  of	  human	  irrationality,	  however,	  one	  should	  not	  take	  recourse	  to	  
ultimate,	   evolutionary	   alibis.	   The	   foibles	   of	   reason	   cannot	   be	   exculpated	   simply	   because	  
they	  display	  some	  evolutionary	  rationale,	  whether	  arising	  from	  error	  management,	  adaptive	  
bias,	   or	   some	   mismatch	   between	   evolved	   heuristics	   and	   modern	   environments.	   It	   is	   no	  
criticism	  of	  a	  screwdriver	  (or	  its	  human	  designer)	  to	  note	  that	  it	  makes	  a	  poor	  crowbar	  –	  but	  
this	  does	  not	  exculpate	  the	  DIY	  enthusiast	  who	  uses	  a	  screwdriver	  as	  a	  lever.	  Likewise,	  we	  
can	   admire	   the	   adaptive	   or	   functional	   design	   of	   a	   heuristic	   while	   still	   impugning	   the	  
rationality	  of	  individuals	  who	  blindly	  misapply	  it	  –	  and	  should	  know	  better.	  
Conversely,	   evidence	   of	   adaptive	   cognitive	   design	   is	   not	   evidence	   of	   human	  
rationality.	  We	   cannot	   fully	   congratulate	   ourselves	   on	   our	   ‘rational’	   behaviour	   unless	   we	  
have	  some	  cognitive	  access	  to	  the	  goal	  we	  want	  to	  achieve,	  our	  strategy	  for	  attaining	  it,	  and	  
our	   reasons	   for	   thinking	   this	   strategy	   is	   or	   might	   be	   successful.	   Insofar	   as	   humans	   are	  
working	  on	  automatic	  pilot,	  profiting	  from	  (or	  being	  misled	  by)	  the	  wisdom	  of	  their	  evolved	  
heuristics,	   the	   normative	   categories	   of	   (ir)rationality	   do	   not	   apply.	   Genuine	   rationality	  
presupposes	  an	  intentional	  striving	  for	  success.	  
The	   program	   of	   ecological	   rationality	   has	   pursued	   two	   distinct	   projects,	  
although	  the	  distinction	  between	  these	  has	  been	  underappreciated.	  In	  its	  best	  moments,	  it	  
has	  convincingly	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  rigid	  application	  of	  content-­‐blind	  logical	  norms	  as	  a	  
benchmark	   of	   rationality	   produces	   an	   uncharitable	   view	   of	   human	   cognition,	   a	   view	  
insensitive	  to	  the	  subtlety	  and	  richness	  of	  human	  reasoning.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  advocates	  
of	  ecological	  rationality,	  together	  with	  evolutionary	  psychologists,	  have	  also	  pointed	  out	  the	  
adaptive	  rationale	  of	  some	  of	  our	  cognitive	  biases.	  That	  research	  is	  certainly	  fascinating,	  but	  
we	  should	  remain	  wary	  of	  subtle	  locus	  shifts	  between	  different	  levels	  of	  rationality.	  In	  some	  
cases	   (e.g.	   superstition,	   gambler’s	   fallacy),	   having	   an	   adapted	   mind	   is	   compatible	   with	  
misbelief	  and	  irrationality.	  Even	  sheer	  stupidity.	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